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REPLY POINTS
Appellant, by and through his attorney of record, hereby
replies to the Brief of Respondent, the State of Utah, as follows:
1.

APPELLANT'S

MOTION

TO

SUPPRESS

STATEMENTS

OF

THE

DEFENDANT.
A.

STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED
AS THEY WERE THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL ARREST.

Appellee

argues

that

the

trial

court's

findings

and

determination that the arrest and detention of the Appellant on a
parole

warrant

were

justified

because

the

parole

hold

was

authorized by statute and was therefor a valid arrest. Appellant's
position on this point is that the underlying purpose and reasons
given by parole agent John Graf justifying the detention of the
Appellant had been satisfied when Appellant and his parole officer,
1

Mr. Mont Court, had a conversation at which time Court advised the
Appellant that he could remain in the Cedar City area until
November 28, 1989, to find work and a residence.

Mr. Court

testified at the suppression hearing on October 16, 1989, that he
had so advised the Appellant. (T. 10/16/89 p.80)

Although after

discussing the matter with Mr. Graf, Mr. Court changed his mind on
the issue of the Appellant remaining in the Cedar City area, that
position was never communicated to the Appellant, who checked in
with the local office as required. Mr. Graf testified at the same
hearing that the basis of the arrest of the Appellant was that he
felt it was inappropriate that he remain in Cedar City and that
they

intended

to

arrest

Appellant

and

then

give

him

that

information. (T.10/16/89 p.51).
Appellant submits that it is improper to use as the basis for
arrest and detention of Appellant the matters which Appellant had
been

informed

by his parole officer to have been

resolved.

Appellant does not agree with the Appellee's position that the
provisions of §77-27-11(2) allow such an arrest. See Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 SCt. 1371, 63 LEd2d 639 (1980), which holds
that absent exigent circumstances, an arrest warrant is required
before a suspect can be arrested in his home. In the present case,
the arrest of the Appellant was made in the early hours of the
morning, without warrant, and effectuated at the home of the
Appellant. There is no question that the real reason the Appellant
was arrested was because of the suspected commission of homicide.
If, as asserted, that was the reason for the arrest of Appellant,
2

the law enforcement officers should have obtained a warrant for the
arrest of the Appellant from a magistrate.
Appell ai 1 1: submil -J thai

I hie

n i i-i-l

WI

I iiipi opei

MI II ill 1

evidence obtained as a result thereof, including statements made by
Appellant while in custody, should have been suppressed.
fclFENDANT * U STATUMKNTIS WIIKRK T A K K N IN V I O L A T I O N O P M I S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Af ipp Ih'i' «. t ,| t pc. ,,.., (, , r t 11 in ] f s p o s 11 i o n t h a t t h e A p p e l l a n t
voluntarily
doctrine,

and knowingly waived his rights under the
that

<*• ' -

"Hi s statement

was

confusing

Miranda

at; first

because

;:i fi: oiiri d e t a i ] tc cieta ii ] ai id in 1 xnd up I he events
t • i , \.,:(e however , ,*;*:• coherent -. u;

Defendant was crying par

settled down during the interview.
recoi: c:i t o s u p p o

\ppellee did not cite <r
l

I

the position that the Appellant was o:

*^

., •

tr. appropriate state ct

: , KI

to knowingly waive the right not to have counsel present auj.-i.ng
questioning or the ri ght not to give evidence against hi mself.

It

is clear that at the point when he was advised of those rights, is
the poi nt a t: wh i ch lie wan most con I" USCM II .

not until 30

minutes into the interview that the Appellant appeared to settle
down and relate events with more rational effort

Appellant agrees

with the argument, ol: t.fp-» Arn »^ ' 1 ei:" that "e 1 f i d e n c e thai d e f e n d a n t w a s
upset" I s not sufficient
erred
Appc
going

f

- support a finding that the trial court

admitting the statement
.

upset , t o g e t h e r
crazy,"

tha t

he

was

However,

evidence

that

w i t h ev jdeiu.v I lial ln> ! "fell
"tripping
3

out,"

and

that

the

lit h in;
he

*/as

"confused" at the time when he waived Miranda rights is sufficient
to establish such error.
Further, although the Appellee referred to the requirem^"*-** ^
Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477 (1981), Appellee did not address
the failure of the trial court to consider the requirement set
forth in Edwards for the trial court to focus on the issue of
"waiver" once the right has been previously asserted. The failure
of the trial court to make any findings on that issue requires
either suppression based upon this Court's review of the record or
a remand to the lower court for reconsideration of that issue and
specific findings as to the basis for decision.
Strain.
2.

~?l°l

P.2d 22/

See State v.

.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED PROSPECTIVE JUROR
MARVA PEAY FOR CAUSE.

Appellee

argues that the action

of the trial

court in

dismissing prospective juror Marva Peay for cause was appropriate
based upon her mental condition.

However, Appellant submits that

there is not sufficient basis in the record to support that
argument and the action of the trial court in dismissing the juror
upon that basis.
At the time the prospective jurors were brought before the
court, the court assembled them together and put to the jurors the
preliminary questions required by Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure which included an inquiry as to whether any of
the jurors was suffering from any physical or mental disability
which would prevent them from serving on the panel.
4

(Tr. at 6)

Prospective juror Peay did not indicate any problem which would
constitute a disabl - the jury.

O n e prospective juror reported a hearing problem which

would present a problem
.i;;*

^mstance p r e v e n t i n g h e r from serving on

tin w h e t l u 1 !

t\\

mil

in

there w a s no response.
"there were -*

ini *\as excused

T h e court then inquired

<1 .11 " s i M ' i r i u s

pr OIJ 1 em, "

tn

*/11 i <" 11

T h e court then m a d e a specific finding that

disabling circumstances

J that

the panel w a s

ifv-* dur i nq
- * - :; ter' -. ; discharge rht duties
panel

w a s then

seated

i * juror." (Tr. 8-9) T h e

and t h e court

further

concern.! ng t h e juror quest] onnaire tin a'
would b e completing.

:

instructed

them

hose qua] i f i ecil to si t

*\e court indicated that the

In explanatio

purpose of t h e questionnaire was

ai ice

» provide additional information

so as to afford t h e parties t h e basis +* determine whether +*hp
jurors could b e fair and impartial

:i

in

K

U,G

;?

:

theii

oackground

or opinions

which

m a y form

t h e basis

for a

challenge under Rule 18 (10) or (14) of t h e Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure
The only basis state for t h e motion to dismiss for cause by
the p r o s e c u t i o n w a s the "inability " t o vote for the death penalty.
(f :

ip.rp w a s no reference t o ment-al state or difficulties
; rasis : r rhe challenge

oi

cueM r

sittinn

, :

-

•

r fa
.

:•<-•-

ne record of examination
uc n IMIII

t i me

udgment b u t would b e willing t . ;,. s^ and would be

willing to impose t h e death penalty if s h e felt it appropriate.
5

(Tr. 857-855).
In response to the specific questions concerning the effect of
her health on her ability to serve, the juror did not indicate that
the condition would be debilitating. When asked if her reluctance
to serve was based upon health reasons, she indicated that her
opposition to serving was related to her job, not health reasons.
(Tr. 838). When asked whether the fact she had been summoned to
jury duty had any effect upon inducing any depression, she stated
"No.11 (Tr. 839). When asked by the court whether she could follow
the instructions of the court, she indicated she could, and further
indicated that she had served on a jury previously and had rendered
a "just" result. (Tr. 851).
The court did not find that the juror was presently suffering
from any condition which would justify a challenge for cause, but
that there was a possibility that she could become depressed and
her deliberations would be affected. (Tr. 855).
Appellee argues that the Appellant has no right to "compel
service of the particular juror who was excused, nor the right to
force the prosecution to exercise a peremptory challenge to exclude
her."

Appellant submits that, in fact, he has such a right under

the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gray v.
Mississippi, 481 US 648.
3.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY REFUSING TO GRANT
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL.

The Appellee incorrectly states the holding of Walker v.
State. 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981) to require that the Appellant must
6

prove that the prosecution presented evidence that w a s false, that
*

t'

-

-

*

.

a reasonable

•

-

•. .

by * e false testimony.
i

*

. . ,

^ , > 3 judgment could L-t affected
Walker prohibits the creatior

false

-

well be

j*.

I '

* w i t n e s s Luce -it * ^ : i, ^

h a v e b e l i e v e d she observed i scabbard strappec

of

* *

-

4-

* the

^

whom

related

seeing

the A p p e l l a n t

witn

statements

iv e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s ,

t e s t imonial i n t e r v i e w s pi:i or t: < ::> p r e ] I in I nary hea

nay

Robbins,

u;e

strapped to hi s 1 ea in an out of c o u r t i ntervip.w.
previous

<

' t h e fact I;M*~ n e i t h e r M s . L u c e : r v:

However, . i
both

*

scabbard
i. in anv

;r

preI

"K;

*< * ner

of their t e s t i m o n i e s at p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g , e v e r m e n t i o n e d seeing
a w e a p o n , said evidence is suspect.
persoi 1 :)f Appe3
of

the

case

The presence of a knife on the

li ttedly c< '

a

evidence whic^

indicating the weapon used 'net I' was a IMITIITHHI kitchen

•

t: :) til: le State 1 3 theory

* * e State

had

obtained

administer the cuts to the victim's
i roni a set which had been in the

apartment w h e r e the Appellant and Defendant Lance Wood had resided.
In W a l k e r , < i t 62 1 I 2 1 6S 1
proseciit i on " •

r. e] i ai i : •€

the court i ndicated that

I Lp< : u i a

fa] se

impression

created

inaccurate testimony would represent a corruption o f the
seeking p r o c e s s .

The court: stated:

T h e false impression which the prosecution knowing
fostered in the present case constitutes prosecutorial
misconduct which seriously interfered with the trial
court's truth-seeking function. W e believe this to be
7

the

truth

by

analogous to the prosecution's knowing use of false
testimony and therefore subject to the same standard of
materiality used in those cases.
In the present case, the actions of the prosecution fall within the
proscription of the standard set forth above.

As to the third

element of affect upon the jury determination, the trial court made
a specific finding that the evidence of possession of a knife by
Appellant would affect the outcome of the jury's consideration of
the matter and that it was of great concern in this particular case
where the jury would also be considering penalty. (Tr. 1887-1888)
Based

upon

the

foregoing,

Appellant

submits

the

only

reasonable and fair remedy was the granting of the mistrial motion
and to require Appellant to proceed before the jury which had heard
the damning evidence was to violate his right to a fair and
impartial hearing.
4.

UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-207 WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY

ENACTED AND ADOPTED.
Appellee asserts that the Utah State Legislature and not the
Utah Supreme Court possessed the power to regulate the courts of
this state by enacting as law rules of criminal procedure and
evidence prior to the enactment of the statute §76-3-207 providing
for the procedure

to be used

in penalty

phases

of capital

homicides. Appellee does not cite any constitutional provision or
any case law to support that position. Appellee simply argues that
since the Constitution of Utah was amended to include Article VIII
Section 4, which specifically states that the Supreme Court shall
possess such power, that the power to regulate proceedings in the
8

courts of this state did not exist in the Supreme Court prior to
that time.

Appellant

submits that the power to govern the

procedure of the courts of this state is and was inherent in the
powers granted to the Supreme Court in Article VIII Section 1 prior
to the amendment of Article VIII and is a basic principal of
separation of powers. This Court has previously recognized that it
has inherent power to regulate the practice of law in this state,
even though no express power to do so is set forth in the
Constitution.

In IN RE UTAH STATE BAR PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF

CHANGES IN DISCIPLINARY RULES ON ADVERTISING, 647 P. 2d 991, Justice
Oaks referred to rule-making powers which were inherent in the
judicial power granted by Article VIII Section 1 of the Utah
Constitution.

At 647 P.2d 992, he stated, "Inherent in that

judicial power is the power to regulate the practice of law."
Rule-making powers of the court have been considered to be an
inherent part of the constitutionally vested judicial power where
the constitutional provisions do not specifically set forth such
powers.

Such rule-making powers include the power to prescribe

such rules of procedure or practice as may be necessary for the
proper administration of justice. See 20 Am Jur 2d Courts Sections
78, 79, and 82.

See also Arizona Podiatry Ass'n v. Director of

Insurance. 422 P. 2d 108, in which the Arizona Supreme Court
determined that rule-making power was inherent in the courts, even
though the Arizona Constitution did not specifically provide for
such prior to a constitutional amendment.

The Washington State

Supreme Court also recognized the inherent powers of rule-making in
9

In Re Marriage of Hermansen. 617 P.2d 462.
The Appellant submits that the effect of the amendment to the
Utah State Constitution, Article VIII Section 4, did not result in
a grant of new authority to make procedural rules in the Supreme
Court, but provided limitation on those inherent powers by giving
the

legislature

the power

to

override

the procedural

rules

established by the Supreme Court if they could obtain the necessary
two-thirds vote.
In any event, Appellant argues that the legislature abdicated
any authority which they may have had to enact procedural rules
when Utah Code Annotated, §78-2-4, which provides as follows:
Rules-making power. The Supreme Court of the State of
Utah has power to prescribe, alter, and revise, by rules,
for all courts of the State of Utah, the forms of
process, writs, pleadings and motions and the practice
and procedure in all civil and criminal actions and
proceed! ?s, including rules of evidence therein, and
also divorce, probate and guardianship proceedings. Such
rules may not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive
rights of any litigant. Upon promulgation the Supreme
Court shall fix the date when such rules shall take
effect and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith
providing for procedure in courts only shall be of no
further force and effect. Nothing in this title, anything to therein to the contrary notwithstanding, shall
in any way limit, supersede or repeal any such rules
heretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court.
The above cited statute, enacted by the legislature in 1951, was,
with exception to the last sentence, identical to former §20-2-4.1,
which was enacted by the legislature in 1943. The 1951 version was
in effect in 1973 when the original version of §76-3-207 providing
sentencing procedures to be employed in capital homicide matters.
That statute, including the various amendments which have since
occurred,

contains

provisions
10

relating

to

procedural

and

evidentiary matters which should be established by this Court.
Appellant

submits

constitutionally

that

the

improper

enactment

and

was

of

also

§76-3-207

was both

in violation

of the

legislatures grant of authority to the Supreme Court in §78-2-4.
Further, Appellant suggests that in the event the Court agrees
that the initial enactment of §76-3-207 was improper, then the
subsequent blanket adoption of statutory rules of procedure and
evidence by this Court in 1985 is not valid since the Court cannot
retroactively validate a statute invalid at its inception.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the Court should grant him the relief
sought on appeal based upon the matters submitted herein and in the
Brief of Appellant.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of July, 1992.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4)
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to R. Paul Van Dam, Utah
Attorney General, at 23 6 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114
this 8th day of July, 1992.
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ADDENDUM
20 Am Jur 2d Courts Sections 78, 79, and 82
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII Section 1
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII Section 4
Utah Code Annotated, §76-3-207
Utah Code Annotated, §77-27-11(2)
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2-4
Utah Rules of criminal Procedure, Rule 18 (10) and (14)
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COURTS

20 Am Jur 2d

§78

an opinion of one of its members which unnecessarily contains such scandalous
matter. 11
Where legislation provides for the appointment of a reporter by the Supreme
Court of the state, it is generally his duty to prepare the official court report.12
Courts of one state may take judicial notice of reports of decisions of courts
of another state published under authority of such other state.13 Where there
is a substantial variance between the presentation of a decision in an unofficial
and an official report respectively, the court of a sister state will consider only
the official report as informative of the decision actually rendered and will
disregard the unofficial report.14
§77. — Headnotes or syllabi.
It has been pointed out that the preparation of headnotes is essentially not
a judicial but a ministerial function, and that therefore the headnotes are
ordinarily prepared by the court reporter.15 Proceeding upon this theory and
upon the principle that it is unconstitutional for a statute to impose other than
judicial duties upon judges, it has been held that a statute which imposes upon
the Supreme Court of a state the duty to make a syllabus of each opinion
rendered by it is unconstitutional and therefore invalid.16
The composition of headnotes or syllabi is, however, sometimes the work of
the court itself,17 and a court may, by rule of court, establish the principle that
the syllabus constitutes the official opinion of the court and that matters outside
the syllabus are not to be regarded as the decision.18 But even so, the rules
stated in a court syllabus must be considered with reference to the facts of the
case and to the questions presented to and considered by the court.19
B. INHERENT POWERS

§ 78. Generally.
The statement that a court has certain "inherent" powers appears frequently
in the reported opinions.20 Sometimes the references are made concerning
11. Lucas v Central Missouri Trust
349 Mo 537, 162 SW2d 569.

Go.

Ind 83, 20 NE 513; Schupbach v Continental
Oil Co. 193 Kan 401, 394 P2d 1.

12. A court reporter is not duty bound, and
cannot be compelled by mandamus, to furnish
copies of the report of a case prior to the
time it is ready for publication; until that
time the opinion, as well as the statement of
the case and the syllabus, ought to be open
for any correction that may be necessary for
the proper understanding of the case. Peck
v Hooker, 61 Conn 413, 23 A 741.

18. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v Baillie, 112
Ohio St 567, 148 NE 233 (Supreme Court
of Ohio).

13. Bostrom v Jennings, 326 Mich 146, 40
NW2d 97.
14. Franklin v Trickey, 9 Ariz 282, 80 P
352.
15. Ex parte Griffiths, 118 Ind 83, 20 NE
513.
§ 65, supra.
16. Ex parte Griffiths, supra.
17. Denham v Holman, 26 Ga 182 (saying
that it is not true that the reporter puts the
headnotes to the cases); Ex parte Griffiths, 118

19. Laube v Prudential Ins. Co. 147 Ohio
St 450, 72 NE2d 76, 2 ALR2d 936; Perry
v Arsham, 101 Ohio App 285, 1 Ohio Ops
2d 266, 136NE2d 141.
Although, under the Ohio Supreme Court
rule, the syllabus of a decision states the law
of the case, it does not state the law for
every somewhat similar case. New York
Cent. R. Co. v Dclich (CA6 Ohio) 252 F2d
522; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v Henery
(CA6 Ohio) 235 F2d 770.
20. Reid v Prentice-Hall, Inc. (CA6 Ohio)
261 F2d 700: Ex parte United States (CA7
Wis) 101 F2d 870, 131 ALR 176, affd without op, United States v Stone, 308 US 519,
84 L ed 441, 60 S Ct 177; Arc Invest. Co. v
Tiffith, 164 Cal App 2d Supp 853, 330 P2d
305; State v Brady, 156 Kan 831, 137 P2d
206; State ex rel. Kennedy v District Court
of Fifth Judicial Dist. 121 Mont 320, 194

439

§79

COURTS

20AmJur2d

specific t\pes of courts, such as courts of record1 or courts of general jurisdiction.2
The phrase "inherent powers" is used to refer to powers included within the
scope of a court's jurisdiction3 which a court possesses irrespective of specific
grant by constitution or legislation.4 Such powers can neither be taken away
nor abiidged by the legislature.5 But the power a court possesses only by virtue
of a statutory grant is not an inherent power.6
The inherent powers of a court do not increase its jurisdiction; they are limited
to such powers as are essential to the existence of the court and necessary to the
orderly and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.7
Courts have inherent power to effectuate the functions and duties imposed
upon them in criminal as well as in civil matters, although perhaps not to the
same extent in criminal as in civil matters. 8
§ 79. Powers classified as inherent.
Courts have inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary
for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. 9 It has
P2d 256, 2 ALR2d 1050; Patterson v Pollock,
84 Ohio App 489, 39 Ohio Ops 2d 566,
53 Ohio L Abs 307, 84 NE2d 606; Hambright v Cleveland (Okla) 360 P2d 493;
Leahey v Farrell, 362 Pa 52, 66 A2d 577;
Shields v Romine, 122 W Va 639, 13 SE2d 16.
1. State v Cannon, 244 NG 399, 94 S£2d
339 (a court of record has the inherent power
to make its records speak the truth; it has
power to amend the record, correct mistakes
of its clerk or other court officers, or remedy
defects or supply omissions in record); Re
Loevinger, 40 SD 450, 167 NW 726 (court
of record has inherent power to make judgment correspond with the real judgment
intended); Merrill v District Court of Fifth
Judicial Dist. 73 Wyo 58, 272 P2d 597.
2. Hain v Newell, 223 Mich 20, 193 ISTW
839; Timmerman v Timmerman, 163 Neb
704, 81 NW2d 135, 65 ALR2d 1372; Re
Mayne's Estate (Wyo) 345 P2d 790.
3. Re Gonsky's Estate, 79 ND 123, 55 N W
2d 60; Merrill v District Court of Fifth
Judicial Dist. 73 Wyo 53, 272 P2d* 597.
The term "inherent power of the judiciary"
means that power which is essential to the
existence, dignity, and functions of the court
from the very fact that it is a court. Re
Nebraska State Bar Asso. 133 Neb 283, 275
N W 2 6 5 , 114 A L R 1 5 1 .
4. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U S 300, 64 I. e d
919, 40 S Ct 543; Arc Invest. Go. v Tiffith,
164 Cal App 2d Supp 853, 330 P2d 305;
Mattfeld v Nester, 226 Minn 106, 32 NV/2d
29f, 3 ALR2d 909; State ex ref. Gentry v
Becker, 351 Mo 769, 174 SW2d 181; Hale
v State, 55 Ohio St 210, 45 NE 199; Com.
v Brownmiller, 141 Pa Super 107, 14 A2d
907.
Courts, since their powers are coequal with
their duties, have inherent power to do everything necessary to carry out the purposes
of their creation. Knox County Council v
State, 217 Ind 493, 29 NE2d 405, 130 ALR
1427.
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5. Re Huff, 352 Mich 402, 91 NW2d
613; State ex rel. Ricco v Biggs, 198 Or 413,
255 P2d 1055, 38 ALR2d 720; Burttschell
v Sheppard, 123 Tex 113, 69 SW2d 402.
The power of a court to hold in contempt
may not be restricted by the legislature.
People ex rel. Rusch v White, 334 111 465, 166
NE 100, 64 ALR 1006; State v Shumafcer,
200 Ind 716, 164 NE 408, 63 ALR 218; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v Gildersleeve, 219 Mo
170, 1 1 8 S W 8 6 .
6. American Life Ins. Co. v Powell, 259
Ala 70, 65 So 2d 516.
Since the authority of a court to suspend
sentences and to grant paroles is purely statutory, it is not an inherent power. State v
Boston, 234 Iowa 1047, 14 NW2d 676; Fuller v State, 100 Miss 811, 57 So 806.
7. Hopkins v Bamhardt, 223 NG 617, 27
SE2d 644.
A court has inherent powers to maintain
its dignity as a court, to secure obedience
to its process and rules, and to punish unseemly behavior. State ex rel. Mahoney v
Superior Court, 78 Ariz 74, 275 P2d 887.
8. State v Brady, 156 Kan 831, 137 P2d
206.
9. Brydonjack v State Bar, 208 Cal 439,
281 P 1018, 66 ALR 1507; State ex rel. County Welfare Bd. v Starke Circuit Court, 238
Ind 35, 147 NE2d 585; Wassung v Wassung,
136 Neb 440, 286 NW 340; Hopkins v Bamhardt, 223 NC 617, 27 SE2d 644; Layman v
State (Okla Crim) 355 P2d 444; School Dist
of Irwin v School Dist. of North Huntingdon
Twp. 374 Pa 134, 97 A2d 96.
Every court of justice, so long as it retains
control of the subject matter and of the
parties, has the inherent power to correct
that which has been wrongfully done by virtue of its process. United States v Morgan,
307 US 183, 83 L ed 1211, 59 S Ct 795.
A court has power to incur and order paid
all expenses that are reasonable and necessary
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been said that courts nave inherent power to summon witnesses ancf compef
their appearance in court,10 to administer oaths,11 to issue or to honor letters
rogatory, lz to prevent abuse of process,13 to provide counsel for the indigent,14 to
have errors in the records corrected,15 to relieve a parly in default,16 to discipline
attorneys at law,17 to take appropriate action in cases of contempt,18 and to do
various other things to maintain order and to function properly as a court 19
C. ADJUDICATION POWER

§ 80. Requirement as to actual, justiciable controversy.
Judicial power is the power to hear and determine a controversy.20 It is the
duty of a court to adjudicate actual or real controversies existing among parties
with adverse interests and conflicting claims,1 Therefore, ordinarily, courts will
for the proper administration of justice by the
court. Schmelzel v Ada County, 16 Idaho 32,
100 P 106 (bill for shaving and cutting hair
of jurors not an expense necessary for the
administration of justice); Knox County
Council v State, 217 Ind 493, 29 NE2d 405,
130 ALR 1427; State ex rel. Gentry v Becker,
351 Mo 769, 174SW2d 181.
10. Burttschell v Sheppard, 123 Tex 113, 69
SW2d 402.
11. State v Townley, 67 Ohio St 21, 65 NE
149.
12. McClure v McClintock, 150 Ky 265,
773, 150 SW 332, 849 (power to issue commission for taking deposition in another state);
Electric Reduction Co. v Crane. 239 Miss 18,
120 So 2d 765 (court had jurisdiction to
honor request for letters rogatory by foreign
court, to appoint commissioner to examine
witness under those letters, and, on proper
showing, to punish witness for contempt in refusing to testify); Ex parte Taylor, 110 Tex
331, 220 SW 74, 9 ALR 963 (power to honor
letters rogatory).
Annotation:
9 ALR 966, s. 108 ALR 384.
13. Reid v Prentice-Hall, Inc. (CA6 Ohio)
261 F2d 700; Arc Invest. Co. v Tiffith, 164
Cal App 2d Supp 853, 330 P2d 305; Morrison
v Guaranty Mortg. & Trust Co. 191 Miss 207,
199 So 110.
14. Knox County Council v State, 217 Ind
493, 29 NE2d 405, 130 ALR 1427; State ex
rcl. Gentry v Becker, 351 Mo 769, 174 SW2d
181.
• 15. Weydeveld v Weydeveld, 100 Colo 301,
67 P2d 72; E. C. Robinson Lumber Co. v
frazel (Mo App) 271 SW2d 610; Gottwals v
Rencher, 60 Nev 35, 98 P2d 481, 126 ALR
1262; State v Cannon, 244 NC 399, 94 SE2d
339; Caprita v Caprita, 145 Ohio St 5, 60 NE
2d 483, 158 ALR 1201; Highland v Strosnider,
H 8 W V a 6 4 7 , 191SE531.
16. Merrill v District Court of Fifth Judicial Dist. 73 Wyo 58, 272 P2d 597.
The discretionary authority to relieve a
Party in default is inherent in all courts of
^cord exercising a general jurisdiction, inde-

pendent of statute. United States Fidelity &
G. Co. v Poctker, 180 Ind 255, 102 NE 372,
error dismd 235 US 683, 59 L ed 423, 35 S Ct
201.
17.

See
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§§ 15-18.
l a . Wells v Gilliam (DC Va) 196 F Supp
792; West v Field, 181 Ga 152, 181 SE 661,
101 ALR 465; People ex rel. Rusch v White,
554 III 465, 166 NE 100t 64 ALR 1006; State
ex tel. Brubaker v Pritchard, 236 Ind 222, 138
NE2d 233, 60 ALR2d 1239; Re Huff, 352
Mfch 402, 91 NW2d 613; Hernreich v Quinn,
350 Mo 770, 168 SW2d 1054; State v Fredlock, 52 W Va 232, 43 SE 153; Re Mayne's
Estate (Wyo) 345 P2d 790.
19. Wells v Gilliam (DC Va) 196 F Supp
792 (holding that inherent powers include
the power to maintain order in the court, to
protect the court or its officers from being
disturbed in the exercise of their functions,
to control the conduct of those attending
court, and to control the courtroom); Dukes v
State, 11 Ind 557 (the court possesses inherent power to appoint an attorney of the
court to conduct prosecution of a criminal
wh^n this is necessary to prevent the failure
of justice); State ex rel. Gentry v Becker, 351
Mo 769, 174 SW2d 181 (no place or facilities for holding court being provided, the
court has the inherent power to provide the
necessary place and equipment; since a court
cannot properly function without certain attaches and attendants, it may, as long as the
necessity exists, appoint such attaches and attendants as are necessary to enable it to properly function as a court); Latham v Casey &
King Corp. 23 Wis 2d 311, 127 NW2d 225
(court has inherent power to dismiss an action. in interest of the orderly administration of
justice).
20. James H. Rhodes & Co. v Chausovsky,
1 3 7 N J L 4 5 9 , 60 A2d 623.
Ijnless there is power to hear, determine,
and decide legal controversies there is no
court. Klein v Hutton, 49 ND 248, 191 NW
485 (holding conciliation board not a court).
1» Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority,
297 US 288, 80 L ed 688, 56 S Ct 466, reh
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necessarily make the whole case moot where attendant questions are, or remain,
conho\ersial, 19 for instance, the question of costs 20
A "moot case ' must be distinguished from a "test case," 1 which is characterized not by lack of an actual controvert between ad\crsc parties, but b\ the
motive to obtain, for general guidance, and generally pnor to the institution
of similar lawsuits, a judicial determination of an important question 2 Thus,
the fact that a person boarded a streetcar for the purpose of making a test case
as to the amount of fare demandable does not affect his nght to maintain an
action for an unlawful ejection after he had tendered the fee actualh due 3
Ordinarily, wheie a case has become moot, the defendant is entitled to ask
for a dismissal of the action on that ground. 4 But the courts ha\e the authority,
and often the duty, to dismiss a moot case on their own initiative, without any
motion to dismiss having been made. 5
D.

RULEMAKING

§ 82. Generally.
It is competent for courts to make and enforce reasonable rules regulating
the practice of cases pending before them 6 In some jurisdictions rulemaking
powers are specifically conferred on courts either bv constitutional provisions7
or by statute. 8 However, it has been said many times that courts have an
inherent power to prescnbe such rules of procedure or practice as may be
necessary for the proper administration of justice.9 And in some cases it is
19. The fact that one convicted of crime
and sentenced therefor has served his sentence
does not necessarily render an appeal moot
where the conviction is attended with other
consequences of a substantial nature Fiswick
v United States, 329 US 211, 91 L ed 196, 67
S Gt 224
The question whether a real-estate broker's
license has been properly revoked does not
become moot upon expiration of the period
for which the license was issued, where the
ground for its revocation may be also a ground
for withholding a new license
Rattray v
Scudder 28 Cal 2d 214, 169 P2d 371, 164
ALR 1356
20. Heitmuller v Stokes, 256 US 359, 65 L
ed 990, 41 S Ct 522
1. Ballentine's Law Diet 2d ed p 831.
2 Stark v Wickard, 321 US 288, 88 L ed
733, 64 S Ct 559 (if numerous parallel cases
are filed, courts may stay litigation in other
cases until determination of test case).
3 . Adams v Union R
A 515

Co 21 R l 134, 42

4. United States v W T Grant Co 345 US
629, 97 L ed 1303, 73 S Ct 894, Jones v
Montague, 194 US 147, 48 L ed 913, 24 S Ct
611 (where nothing but moot case remains,
motion to dismiss must be sustained)
5. Magraw v Donovan (DC Minn) 177 F
Supp 803
6. Lehnen v Hines, 88 Kan 58, 127 P 612.
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7 State v Bailey, 165 La 341, 115 So 613,
58 ALR 1, Winberry v Salisbury, 5 NJ 240,
74 A2d 406, cert den 340 US 877, 95 L ed
638, 71 S C t 123
Rules of court adopted pursuant to constitutional authority supersede inconsistent statutes Jawor^ki v Opa-Locka (Fla) 149 So 2d
33, transf (Fla App) 149 So 2d 566
8. Hudson v Parker, 156 US 277, 39 L ed
424 15 S Gt 450, Re Dattilo, 136 Conn 488,
72 A2d 50, Ownbe> v Morgan (Sup) 30 Del
(7 Boyce) 297, 105 A 838 affd 256 US 94,
65 L ed 837, 41 S Gt 433 17 ALR 873,
Weil v Federal L Ins Go 264 III 425, 106 NE
246, M K Goet? Biewing Go v Wain 92
Neb 614, 139 NW 230, State v Roy, 40 N M
397, 60 P2d 646, 110 \ L R 1, Roberts v
White, 32 R I 185, 78 A 497, Maryville v
Waters, 207 Tenn 213, 338 SW2d 608, Davis
v Dunn, 90 Vt 253 98 A 8 1 , Stevenson \ Milwaukee County, 140 Wis 14, 121 NW 654
Annotation:
110 ALR 28, s 158 ALR 707.
A statute which authorizes a court to adopt
and promulgate rules of practice is not unconstitutional as an attempt to delegate legislative power to the judiciary
Sibbach v
Wilson & Co 312 US 1, 85 L ed 479, 61 S Ct
422, Florida State Bar Asso 's Petition, 155 Fla
710, 21 So 2d 605, 158 ALR 699, Diversey
Liquidating Corp v Neunkirchen, 370 111 523,
1 9 N E 2 d 3 6 3 , 120 ALR 1395
9 Fall v Eastin, 215 US 1, 54 L ed 65, 30
S Ct 3, Ex parte Wilkey, 233 Ala 375, 172
So 111, Christy v Speer, 210 Ark 756, 197
SW2d 466, Re Dattilo, 136 Conn 488, 72 A2d
50, Slagle v Valenziano, 13 \ Ind App 360,
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said that the rulemaking power of a court may not be validly interfered with
by the legislature.10
Although the rulemaking power is generally vested in the highest court of a
jurisdiction,11 and this includes the power to make rules regulating the procedure and practice in courts the decisions of which are subject to its review,12
lower courts may also have such power.13 The rule of a lower court must not,
however, conflict with the rules prescribed by the higher court,14 and in some
jurisdictions a rule prescribed by a lower court is subject to approval by the
highest court.15
A rule of court must be distinguished from a mere custom of a court,16 though
a long-established practice, uniformly followed by the courts, may have the same
clicet as a rule of court.17
§ 83. How rules promulgated.
Although it has been said that rules of court must be published in some
permanent form so as to give notice thereof to anyone they do or might affect,18
and that rules cannot be promulgated orally, but must be written,19 orally
lflfl NE2d 286; Re Sparrow, 338 Mo 203, 90
S\V2d 401; State v Roy, 40 N M 397, 60 P2d
h Hi. 110 ALR 1; Goodwin v Bickford, 20 Okla
«»1. 93 P 548; Zeuske v Zeuske, 55 O r 65,
H»i P 648, 105 P 249; Ashford v Goodwin,
1«.; Tex 491, 131 SW 535; Harris v Harris,
1M» Va 351, 186 SE 29; Stevenson v Milwaukee County, 140 Wis 14, 121 NW 654.
Annotation:
110 ALR 23, s. 158 ALR 706.
10. Parkison v Thompson, 164 Ind 609,
7 J NE 109 (legislature has no more right to
break clown the rules prescribed by a court for
• ••mlucting its official business than the court
Ins to prescribe the mode and manner in
v. !ii« h the legislature shall perform its legislative duties); Burton v Mayer, 274 Ky 263,
11.". S\V2d 547; Jordan v Andrus, 26 Mont 37,
«••» P ")02: Herndon v Imperial F. Ins. Go. I l l
NC'.JM, 1 6 S E 4 6 5 .
Annotation:
110 ALR 37, s. 158 ALR 709.
11. Washington-Southern Nav. Co. v Baltimore & P. S. B. Go. 263 US 629, 68 L ed
»w. U S Ct 220; Guthrie v Blakely, 127 Ind
\|>1> 1 10, 131 NE2d 357 (intermediate appell.itr court has no authority to amend, alter, or
• i-norc rule of Supreme Court); M. K. Goetz
Hn-winir C a v W a l n ? 92 N e b 6 1 4 > 139 NW
•": State v Roy, 40 NM 397, 60 P2d 646,
!
- ' ALR I; Roberts v White, 32 R I 185, 78
\ W : Wcibrl v Gardner, 45 SD 349, 187 NW
••-"'. in ALR 50; Davis v Dunn, 90 Vt 253,
'•iARl.
Annotation:
110 ALR 55, s. 158 ALR 728.
12. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v Standard
Asphalt & Rubber Co. 275 US 372, 72 L ed
'}<> - 4 8 S Ct 183; Winberry v Salisbury, 5
• J ; 1<>. 74 A2d 406, cert den 340 US 877, 95
[: H fK*a, 71 S Ct 123. But see Yazoo & M.
>;;"'-v R. Co. v Kirk, 102 Miss 4 1 , 58 So
f/., " 'f t a k m S the position that the highest
'•urt of a s t a t e k a s n o a u t j l o r j t y t o prescribe
• ' , ! < T proceedings in the trial court.
13

kronx Brass Foundry v Irving Trust Co.

297 U S 230, 80 L ed 657, 56 S Ct 451 (approving rule of District Court regulating exercise of right of voluntary discontinuance);
Gist v Drakely, 2 Gill (Md) 330; Roberts v
White, 32 R I 185, 78 A 497; Ashford v Goodwin, 103 Tex 491, 131 SW 535; Okerlund v
Robinson, 74 Utah 602, 201 P 200 (referring
to statute conferring power on every court of
record to adopt rules for its government).
General orders of the Supreme Court may
be supplemented by local rules. Re G. W.
Giannini, Inc. (GA2 NY) 90 F2d 445, 111
ALR 1492.
14. Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Co. v James,
272 US 701, 71 L ed 481, 47 S Ct 286; Re
Nuotila Estate, 360 Mich 256, 103 NW2d
638, 82 ALR2d 923; Davis v Dunn, 90 Vt
253, 98 A 8 1 ; Stevenson v Milwaukee County,
140 Wis 14, 121 N W 6 5 4 .
Annotation:
110 ALR 51, s. 158 ALR 715.
15. Roberts v White, 32 R I 185, 78 A 497.
16. Patton v Evans, 92 Utah 524, 69 P2d
969, 112 ALR 589, holding that a custom
in the state court to postpone the trial of a
case reached for trial when attorneys are engaged in trying a case in a federal court, until
the completion of the trial in the federal
court, does not have the force and effect of a
rule of court so as to entitle the party whose
attorney is so engaged to a continuance as a
matter of right.
17. Payne v Garth (GA8 Neb) 285 F 301;
Detroit Heating & Lighting Co. v Kemp (CC
Md) 182 F 848; Patton v Evans, 92 Utah
524, 69 P2d 969, 112 ALR 589 (holding,
however, that this does not apply to a question
of judicial courtesy or judicial administration, by a court, of its calendar).
18. McDonald v State, 172 Ind 393, 88 NE
673; Brewer v State, 187 Tcnn 396, 215 SW2d
798.
19. Naro v State, 212 Ala 5, 101 So 666
445
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Sec. 13. [Board of Examiners.]
Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, Attorney General, and State Auditor shall constitute a
Board of Examiners, with power to examine all such
claims against the State as provided by law, and perform such other duties as provided by law, and no
such claim against the State shall be passed upon by
the Legislature without having been considered and
acted upon by the Board of Examiners
1979
Sec. 14. [Duties of Lieutenant Governor.!
The Lieutenant Governor shall serve on all boards
and commissions m lieu of the Governor whenever so
designated by the Governor, shall perform such duties as may be delegated by the Governor, and shall
perform such other duties as may be provided by law
1979

Sec. 15.

[Duties of State Auditor and State
Treasurer.l
The State Auditor shall perform financial post
audits of Public Accounts, except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, and the State Treasurer
shall be the custodian of public moneys, and each
shall perform such other duties as provided by law
1979

Sec. 16. [Duties of A t t o r n e y General.]
The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of
the State officers, except as otherwise provided by
this Constitution, and shall perform such other duties
as provided by law
1979
Sec. 17.

[Repealed.]

1986

Sec. 18.

[Compensation of s t a t e and district officers.]
The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, State Auditor,
State Treasurer, Attorney General and such other
State and District officers as provided for by law,
shall receive for their services a compensation as
fixed by law
The compensation for said officers as provided in
all laws enacted pursuant to this Constitution, shall
be in full for all services rendered by said officers,
respectively, in any official capacity or employment
during their respective terms of office No such officer
shall receive for the performance of any official duty
any fee for personal use, but all fees fixed by law for
the performance by either of them of any official duty,
shall be collected in advance and deposited with the
State Treasurer monthly to the credit of the State
The Legislature may provide for the payment of actual and necessary expenses of said officers while
traveling in the performan ce of official duties
1979

Sec. 19. [Grants and commissions.]
All grants and commissions shall be in the name
and by the a u t h o n t y of the State of Utah, sealed with
the Great Seal of the State, signed by the Governor,
and countersigned by such officer as provided by law
1979

S e c 20.

[The Great Seal.]

There shall be a seal of the State, which shall be
called "The Great Seal of the State of Utah," and
shall be kept by such officer as provided by law 1979
Sec. 21. [United States' officials ineligible to
hold state office.]
No person, while holding any office under the
United States' government shall hold any office under the State government of Utah
1979
Sees. 22,23. [Transferred.]
Sec. 24. [Repealed.]

i960
1979
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\RTICLE VIII

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section
1 [Judicial powers — Courts ]
2 [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law
unconstitutional — Justice unable to
participate ]
3 [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court ]
4 [Rule-making power of Supreme Court — Judges
pro tempore — Regulation of practice
of law ]
5 [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts —
Right of appeal ]
6 [Number of judges of district court and other
courts — Divisions ]
7 [Qualifications of justices and judges ]
8 [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate
approval]
9 [Judicial retention elections ]
10 [Restrictions on justices and judges ]
11 [Judges of courts not of record ]
12 [Judicial Council — Chief justice as administra
tive officer ]
13 [Judicial Conduct Commission ]
14 [Compensation of justices and judges ]
15 [Mandatory retirement ]
16 [Public prosecutors ]
17 to 28 [Repealed ]
Section 1. [Judicial p o w e r s — Courts.]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a
supreme court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction
known as the district court, and in such other courts
as the Legislature by statute may establish The Su
preme Court, the district court, and such other courts
designated by statute shall be courts of record Courts
not of record shall also be established by statute 1984

Sec. 2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law unconstitutional — Justice
unable to participate.]
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and
shall consist of at least five justices The number of
justices may be changed by statute, but no change
shall have the effect of removing a justice from office
A chief justice shall be selected from among the jus
tices of the Supreme Court as provided by statute
The chief justice may resign as chief justice without
resigning from the Supreme Court The Supreme
Court by rule may sit and render final judgment ei
ther en banc or in divisions The court shall not de
clare any law unconstitutional under this constitu
tion or the Constitution of the United States, except
on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the
Supreme Court If a justice of the Supreme Court 1*
disqualified or otherwise unable to participate in a
cause before the court, the chief justice, or in the
event the chief justice is disqualified or unable to par
ticipate, the remaining justices, shall call an active
judge from an appellate court or the district court to
19W
participate in the cause
Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.]
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction
to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer ques
tions of state law certified by a court of the Unite
States The Supreme Court shall have appellate juris
diction over all other matters to be exercised as P r 0
vided by statute, and power to issue all writs an
orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme
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Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of
any cause
iW4
gee. 4* [Rule-making p o w e r of Supreme Court
— J u d g e s p r o tempore — Regulation
of practice of law.l
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure
and evidence to be used in the courts of the state and
ghall by rule manage the appellate process The Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of
two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
perform any judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
admitted to practice law m Utah The Supreme Court
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law
1984
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other
courts — Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in
all matters except as limited by this constitution or
by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs
The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
provided by statute The jurisdiction of all other
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided
by statute Except for matters filed originally with
the Supreme Court, there shall be m all cases an
appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction
to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause
1984

Sec. 6. [Number of j u d g e s of district court and
other courts — Divisions.]
The number of judges of the district court and of
other courts of record established by the Legislature
thall be provided by statute No change in the number ofjudges shall have the effect of removing a judge
from office during a judge's term of office Geographic
divisions for all courts of record except the Supreme
Court may be provided by statute No change in divisions shall have the effect of removing a judge from
office during a judge's term of office
1984
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Legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the
Legislature appoint members to, any Judicial Nominating Commission The Senate shall consider and
render a decision on each judicial appointment within
30 days of the date of appointment If necessary, the
Senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session
for the purpose of considering judicial appointments
The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a
majority of all members of the Senate If the Senate
fails to approve the appointment, the office shall be
considered vacant and a new nominating process
shall commence Selection of judges shall be based
solely upon consideration of fitness for office without
regard to any partisan political considerations
1984
Sec. 9. [Judicial retention elections.!
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject
to an unopposed retention election at the first general
election held more than three years after appointment Following initial voter approval, each Supreme
Court justice every tenth year, and each judge of
other courts of record every sixth year, shall be subject to an unopposed retention election at the corresponding general election Judicial retention elections shall be held on a nonpartisan ballot in a manner provided by statute If geographic divisions are
provided for any court of record, the judges of those
courts shall stand for retention election only in the
geographic division to which they are selected
1984
Sec. 10. [Restrictions on justices and judges.]
Supreme court justices, district court judges, and
judges of all other courts of record while holding office
may not practice law, hold any elective nonjudicial
public office, or hold office m a political party
1984
Sec. 11. [Judges of courts not of record.l
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected m a
manner, for a term, and with qualifications provided
by statute However, no qualification may be imposed
which requires judges of courts not of record to be
admitted to practice law The number of judges of
courts not of record shall be provided by statute 1984

S e c 7. [Qualifications of justices a n d judges.]
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years
old, United States citizens, Utah residents for five
years preceding selection, and admitted to practice
law in Utah Judges of other courts of record shall be
at least 25 years old, United States citizens, Utah
residents for three years preceding selection, and adnutted to practice law in Utah If geographic divisions are provided for any court, judges of that court
snail reside in the geographic division for which they
w* selected
1984

S e c 12. [Judicial Council — Chief justice as administrative officer.!
A Judicial Council is established, which shall adopt
rules for the administration of the courts of the state
The Judicial Council shall consist of the chief justice
of the Supreme Court, as presiding officer, and such
other justices, judges, and other persons as provided
by statute There shall be at least one representative
on the Judicial Council from each court established
by the constitution or by statute The chief justice of
the Supreme Court shall be the chief administrative
officer for the courts and shall implement the rules
adopted by the Judicial Council
1984

^ e * 8. [Vacancies — Nominating commissions
— Senate approval.]
When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the
governor shall fill the vacancy by appointment from a
"& of at least three nominees certified to the governor
by the Judicial Nominating Commission having
authority over the vacancy The governor shall fill
« e vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of
nominees If the governor fails to fill the vacancy
^ithin the time prescribed, the chief justice of the
Supreme Court shall within 20 days make the appointment from the list of nominees The Legislature
°y statute shall provide for the nominating commissions' composition and procedures No member of the

Sec. 13. [Judicial Conduct Commission.]
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established
which shall investigate and conduct confidential
hearings regarding complaints against any justice or
judge Following its investigations and hearings, the
Judicial Conduct Commission may order the repn
mand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary
retirement of any justice or judge for the following
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct
m office,
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a
felony under state or federal law,
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties,
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(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital
felony shall be sentenced in accordance with Section
76-3-207, and sentence shall be death or life imprisonment as the court or jury, in accordance with this
section, shall determine.
(2) The judgment of conviction and sentence of
death shall be subject to automatic review by the
Utah State Supreme Court within 60 days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record
unless time is extended an additional period not to
exceed 30 days by the Utah State Supreme Court for
good cause shown. Such review by the Utah State
Supreme Court shall have priority over all other
cases and shall be heard in accordance with rules
promulgated by the Utah State Supreme Court. 1977
76-3-207. Capital felony — Sentencing proceeding.
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been
found guilty of a capital felony, there shall be further
proceedings before the court or jury on the issue of
sentence. In the case of a plea of guilty to a capital
felony, the sentencing proceedings shall be conducted
by the court which accepted the plea or by a jury upon
request of the defendant. When a defendant has been
found guilty of a capital felony, the proceedings shall
be conducted before the court or jury which found the
defendant guilty, provided the defendant may waive
hearing before the jury, in which event the hearing
shall be before the court. If, however, circumstances
make it impossible or impractical to reconvene the
same jury for the sentencing proceedings the court
may dismiss that jury and convene a new jury for
such proceedings. If a retrial of the sentencing proceedings is necessary as a consequence of a remand
from an appellate court, the sentencing authority
shall be determined as provided in Subsection (4).
(2) In these sentencing proceedings, evidence may
be presented as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's
character, background, history, mental and physical
condition, and any other facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence the court deems
to have probative force may be received regardless of
its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence. The state's attorney and the defendant shall be
permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death. Aggravating circumstances shall include those as outlined in Section 76-5-202. Mitigating circumstances shall include the following:
(a) the defendant has no significant history of
prior criminal activity;
(b) the homicide was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(c) the defendant acted under extreme duress
or under the substantial domination of another
person;
(d) at the time of the homicide, the capacity of
the defendant to appreciate the criminality
(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirement of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease, intoxication, or influence of drugs;
(e) the youth of the defendant at the time of
the crime;
(f) the defendant was an accomplice in the homicide committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor; and
(g) any other fact in mitigation of the penalty.
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(3) The court or jury, as the case may be, shall
retire to consider the penalty. In all proceedings before a jury, under this section, it shall be instructed
as to the punishment to be imposed upon a unanimous verdict for death and that to be imposed if a
unanimous verdict for death is not found. If the jury
reports unanimous agreement to impose the sentence
of death, the court shall discharge the jury and shall
impose the sentence of death. If the jury is unable to
reach a unanimous verdict imposing the sentence of
death, the court shall discharge the jury and impose
the sentence of life imprisonment.
(4) Upon any appeal by the defendant where the
sentence is of death, the appellate court, if it finds
prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding only,
may set aside the sentence of death and remand the
case to the trial court for new sentencing proceedings
to the extent necessary to correct the error or errors.
No error in the sentencing proceedings shall result in
the reversal of the conviction of a capital felony. In
cases of remand for new sentencing proceedings, all
exhibits and a transcript of all testimony and other
evidence properly admitted in the prior trial and sentencing proceedings shall be admissible in the new
sentencing proceedings, and if the sentencing proceeding was before a:
(a) jury a new jury shall be impaneled for the
new sentencing proceeding;
(b) judge, the original trial judge shall conduct
the new sentencing proceeding; or
(c) judge and the original trial judge is unable
or unavailable to conduct a new sentencing proceeding, then another judge shall be designated
to conduct the new sentencing proceeding.
(5) In the event t h e death penalty is held to be
unconstitutional by t h e U t a h Supreme Court or t h e
United States Supreme Court, t h e court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death
for a capital felony shall cause such person to be
brought before the court, and the court shall sentence
the person to life imprisonment, and any person who
is thereafter convicted of a capital felony shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.
1991
76-3-208. Imprisonment — Custodial authorities.
(1) Persons sentenced to imprisonment shall be
committed to the following custodial authorities:
(a) Felony commitments shall be to the Utah
State Prison;
(b) Class A misdemeanor commitments may
be to the Utah State Prison if the defendant consents;
(c) Misdemeanor commitments shall be to the
jail, or other facility designated by the town, city
or county where the defendant was convicted.
(2) Custodial authorities may place a prisoner in a
facility other than the one to which he was committed
when:
(a) It does not have space to accommodate him;
or
(b) The security of the institution or inmate
requires it.
1974
PART 3
FINES A N D S P E C I A L SANCTIONS
76-3-301. Fines of persons.
(1) A person convicted of a n offense m a y be sentenced to pay a fine, not exceeding:
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nffior offense as described in Section 76-3-407, is
aot eligible for release on parole by the Board of
Pardons until the offender has fully completed
serving the minimum mandatory sentence rniD0S ed by the court This subsection supersedes
any other provision of law
*~ (b) The board may not parole any offender or
commute or terminate the sentence of any offender before the offender has served the minimum term for the offense, where
(1) the offender was convicted of forcible
sexual abuse, forcible sodomy, rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, or aggravated sexual assault as defined in Chapter 5, Title 76, and
(u) the victim of the offense was under 18
years of age at the time the offense was committed
(3) The board may issue subpoenas to compel the
t e n d a n c e of witnesses and the production of evidence, to administer oaths, and to take testimony for
tfae purpose of any investigation by the board or any
of its members or by a designated hearing examiner
fak the performance of its duties A person who willfctly disobeys a properly served subpoena issued by
$ § board is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
tufa) (a) The board may adopt rules consistent with
law for its government, meetings and hearings,
the conduct of proceedings before it, the parole
and pardon of offenders, the commutation and
termination of sentences, and the general conditions under which parole may be granted and
revoked.
(b) The rules shall ensure an adequate opportunity for victims to participate at hearings held
under this chapter, as provided in Section
77-27-9 5
(c) The rules may allow the board to establish
reasonable and equitable time limits on the presentations by all participants m hearings held
m under this chapter
(5) The board does not provide counseling or therapy for victims as a part of their participation in any
hearing under this chapter
1988
77-27-9.5. Victim m a y attend hearings.
(1) (a) As used in this section, "hearing" means a
hearing for a parole grant or revocation, or a rehearing of either of these if the offender is
present
* (b) At a redetermination or special attention
hearing, if the offender is not present, the victim
is not permitted to be present However, under
this subsection the board shall give consideration
to any presentation previously given by the victim, regarding that offender
(2) When a hearing is held regarding any offense
Jjmmitted by the defendant that involved the victim,
« • victim may attend the hearing to present his
Jj** 8 concerning the decisions to be made regarding
« • defendant
(3) The notice of the hearing shall be timely sent to
™& victim at his most recent address of record with
° * Board of Pardons The notice shall include
(a) the date, time, and location of the hearing,
(b) a clear statement of the reason for the
hearing, including all offenses involved,
(c) the statutes and rules applicable to the victim's participation in the hearing, and
(d) the address and telephone number of an
office or person the victim may contact for fur-
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ther explanation of the procedure regarding victim participation in the hearing
(4) The victim, or family members if the victim is
deceased or unable to attend due to physical incapacity, may
(a) attend the hearing to observe,
(b) make a statement to the board or its appointed examiner either in person or through a
representative appointed by the victim or his
family, and
(c) remain present for the hearing if he appoints another to make a statement on his behalf
(5) The statement may be presented
(a) as a written statement, which may also be
read aloud, if the presenter desires, or
(b) as an oral statement presented by the person selected under Subsection (4)
(6) The victim may be accompanied by a member of
his family or another individual, present to provide
emotional support to the victim
(7) The victim may, upon request, testify outside
the presence of the defendant but a separate hearing
may not be held for this purpose
1988
77-27-9.7.

Victim right to notification of release
— Notice b y board.
A victim entitled to notice of the hearings regarding parole under Section 77-27-9 5 shall also be notified by the Board of Pardons of the nght of victims to
be advised upon request of other releases of the defendant under Section 64-13-14 7 The board may include this notification in the same notice sent under
Section 77-27-9 5 The board shall coordinate with
the Department of Corrections to ensure notice under
this section is provided to victims
1991
77-27-10. Conditions of parole.
(1) When the Board of Pardons releases an offender
on parole, it shall issue to the parolee a certificate
setting forth the conditions of parole which he shall
accept and agree to as evidenced by his signature
affixed to the agreement A copy of the agreement
shall be delivered to the Department of Corrections
and a copy shall be given to the parolee The original
shall remain with the board's file
(2) If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to violate Section 76-5-301 1, Subsection
76-5-302(1), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402 1, 76-5-402 2,
76-5-402 3, 76-5-403, 76y-5-4031, 76-5-404, 76-5404 1, or 76-5-405 is released on parole, the board
shall order outpatient mental health counseling and
treatment as a condition of parole
1986
77-27-11. Revocation of parole.
(1) The board may revoke the parole of any person
who is found to have violated any condition of his
parole
(2) If a parolee is detained by the Department of
Corrections or any law enforcement official for a suspected violation of parole, the Department of Corrections shall immediately report the alleged violation
to the board, by means of an incident report, and
make any recommendation regarding the incident
No parolee may be held for a penod longer than 72
hours, excluding weekends and holidays, without
first obtaining a warrant
(3) Any member of the board may issue a warrant
based upon a certified warrant request to a peace officer or other persons authorized to arrest, detain, and
return to actual custody a parolee, and may upon arrest or otherwise direct the Department of Corrections to determine if there is probable cause to believe
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living together in illicit relations or under
void marriage, 31 A. L. R. 2d 1315.
Jurisdiction in actions involving re-employment of discharged servicemen, 29
A. L. E. 2d 1340, 9 A. L. E. Fed. 225.
Mandamus to governor, 105 A. L. E.
1124.
Power of appellate court to reconsider
its decision after mandate has issued, 84
A. L. E. 579.
Power of court to conduct general investigation of practices of members of bar
without charges against particular members, 60 A. L. E. 860.
Power of legislature, absent constitutional provision in that regard, to authorize or require court or justices thereof
to render advisory opinion upon request

of governor or of either house of legislature, 103 A. L. E. 1087.
Prospective or retroactive operation
of overruling decision, 10 A. L. E. 3d 1371.
Eight of winning party to appeal from
judgment granting him full relief sought,
69 A. L. E. 2d 701.
Stay or supersedeas on appellate review
in mandamus proceeding, 88 A. L. E. 2d
420.
Superintending control over inferior tribunals, 112 A. L. E. 1351.
Law Reviews.
The Utah Supreme Court and the Eule
of Law: Phillips and the Bill of Eights
in Utah, Edwin B. Firmage, 1975 Utah L.
Eev. 593.

DECISIONS UNDEE FOEMEE LAW
perd v. District Court of Second Judicial
Dist., 1 U. 340.

Chancery jurisdiction.
Territorial Supreme Court had original
chancery jurisdiction to issue injunctions.
Kerr v. Woolley, 3 U. 456, 24 P. 831.

Prohibition.
Under Code of Civil Procedure of 1884,
territorial Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition.
Yearian v. Speirs, 4 U. 385, 10 P. 609, 11
P. 509, overruled on other grounds in
People v. Douglass, 5 U. 283, 14 P. 801.
Territorial Supreme Court had unquestionable authority to issue writ of prohibition in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Yearian v. Speirs, 4 U. 385, 10 P. 609, 11
P. 509, overruled on other grounds in
People v. Douglass, 5 U. 283, 14 P. 801.

Jurisdiction generally.
Predecessor section conferred the only
original jurisdiction possessed by Supreme
Court; in all other cases its jurisdiction
was appellate, and it was to be classed as
a court mainly appellate. Godbe v. Salt
Lake City, 1 U. 68.
Mandamus.
Territorial Supreme Court had no authority to issue a writ of mandamus in
exercise of its original jurisdiction. Shep-

78-2-3. Three justices must concur in judgment.—The concurrence of
three justices of the Supreme Court is necessary to pronounce a judgment;
if three do not concur, the case must be reheard.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, disqualified justice was sufficient compliance with predecessor section. In re
Supp., 104-25-3.
Thompson's Estate, 72 U. 17, 269 P. 103.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical with former Collateral References.
Courts<§=>102, 248.
section 20-2-3 (Code 1943) which was re21 C.J.S. Courts § 465.
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
20 Am. Jur. 2d 432, Courts §§ 67-69.
What constitutes "concurrence."
Concurrence by district judge sitting for
78-2-4. Rules-making power.—The Supreme Court of the State of Utah
has power to prescribe, alter and revise, by rules, for all courts of the
State of Utah, the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions and the
practice and procedure in all civil and criminal actions and proceedings
including rules of evidence therein, and also divorce, probate and guard
ianship proceedings. Such rules may not abridge, enlarge or modify the
substantive rights of any litigant. Upon promulgation the Supreme Court
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shall fix the date when such rules shall take effect and thereafter all laws
in conflict therewith providing for procedure in courts only shall be of
no further force and effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to
the contrary notwithstanding, shall in any way limit, supersede or repeal
any such rules heretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-2-4.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical with section
20-2-4.10 (Code 1943, Supp.) except for the
addition of the last sentence by Laws
1951, ch. 58, § 1. Section 3 of that chapter
repealed the former section.

ment of eviction by paying the delinquent
rent is a substantive right. Monter v.
Kratzers Specialty Bread Co., 29 U. (2d)
18, 504 P. 2d 40.
Collateral References.
Courts<&=>78-86, 248.
21 C.J.S. Courts § 465.
20 Am. Jur. 2d 444, Courts §§ 82-86.

Cross-Keference.
Eight of courts of record to make own
rules, 78-7-6.

Power of court to prescribe rules of
pleading, practice or procedure, 110 A.
L. E. 22, 158 A. L. E. 705.

Substantive rights.
The right to be relieved from a judg-

78-2-5. Court always open for transaction of business.—The Supreme
Court shall always be open for the transaction of business. Adjournments
from day to day, or from time to time, are to be construed as recesses in
the sessions, and shall not prevent the court from sitting at any time.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-2-5.

Cross-Reference.
Terms of court, Const. Art. VIII, § 4.
Collateral References.
Courts<§=>248.
21 C.J.S. Courts § 465.
20 Am. Jur. 2d 418, Courts § 42.

Compiler's Notes.
This section relates generally to the
same subject matter as former section 202-5 (Code 1943) which was repealed by
Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. The legislature in
re-enacting this section as a part of the
Judicial Code made substantial changes in
the phraseology of the section.

Calling of special or extra term of court
by governor, 16 A. L. R. 1306.

78-2-6. Clerk.—The Supreme Court shall appoint a clerk, who shall
hold his office during the pleasure of the court.
Fees, 21-1-4.
Practice of law or partnership with
practicing attorney prohibited, 78-51-39.
Salary of clerk, 67-8-2.

History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-2-6.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical with former
section 20-2-6 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Cross-Eeferences.
Appointment of clerk
Const. Art. VIII, § 14.

and

Collateral References.
Clerks of Courts<£=>l; Courts<®=»55, 248.
14 C.J.S. Clerks of Courts § 1 ; 21 C.J.S.
Courts §§ 140, 465.
15A Am. Jur. 2d 139, Clerks of Court
§1.

reporter,

78-2-7. Bond.—The clerk of the Supreme Court must execute an official
bond to the state, in the sum of $10,000, conditioned for the faithful
performance of his duties.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-2-7.

CompUer's Notes.
This section is identical with former
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opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has rested;
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause,
otherwise permits;
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any
other appropriate time, the court shall instruct
the jury; and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury
on either side or on both sides without argument,
the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close
by responding to the defense argument. The
court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party and the time to be
allowed for argument.
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified
during trial and an alternate juror has been selected,
the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no
alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate
to proceed with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial
ordered.
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for
the jury to view the place in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, or in which any
other material fact occurred, it may order them to be
conducted in a body under the charge of an officer to
the place, which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person
so appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on
any subject connected with the trial and to return
them into court without unnecessary delay or at a
specified time.
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors
are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they
shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty
not to converse among themselves or to converse
with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any
other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon
until the case is finally submitted to them.
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may
take with them the instructions of the court and all
exhibits and papers which have been received as evidence, except depositions; and each juror may also
take with him any notes of the testimony or other
proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any
other person.
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury,
they shall be kept together in some convenient place
under charge of an officer until they agree upon a
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by
the court. Except by order of the court, the officer
having them under his charge shall not allow any
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon
their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is
rendered, communicate to any person the state of
their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if
they desire to be informed on any point of law arising
in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of
them, who shall communicate such request to the
court. The court may then direct that the jury be
brought before the court where, in the presence of the
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defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond
to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the
inquiry in writing without having the jury brought
before the court, in which case the inquiry and the
response thereto shall be entered in the record.
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on
its face, it may be corrected by the jury under the
advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again.
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the
court may issue an order dismissing any information
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground
that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish
the offense charged therein or any lesser included
offense.
Rule 18. Selection of jury.
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number
of the jurors that are to try the cause plus such an
additional number as will allow for all peremptory
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause
sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate
thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a
time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many
of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, in
the order in which they appear on the list, and the
persons whose names are so called shall constitute
the jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant
to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors
or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter
event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant
to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the
prospective jurors additional questions requested by
counsel or the defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an
individual juror.
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve
at a particular court or for the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all jurors summoned and may be
taken by either party.
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded
only on a material departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection,
drawing, summoning and return of the
panel.
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be
taken before the jury is sworn and shall be m
writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall
specifically set forth the facts constituting
the grounds of the challenge.
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed
by the adverse party, a hearing may be had
to try any question of fact upon which the
challenge is based. The jurors challenged,
and any other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing thereon.
(iv) The court shall decide the challengeIf the challenge to the panel is allowed, the
court shall discharge the jury so far as the
trial in question is concerned. If a challenge
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is denied, the court shall direct the selection
of jurors to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be
, either peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an
individual juror may be made only before the
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court
may, for good cause, permit it to be made after
the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence
is presented. In challenges for cause the rules
relating to challenges to a panel and hearings
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause
shall be taken first by the prosecution and then
by the defense,
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given. In capital
cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to
four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases,
each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges.
If there is more than one defendant the court may
jjlow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or
jointly.
* (e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the
following grounds:
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed
by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which
renders one incapable of performing the duties of
a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
degree to the person alleged to be injured by the
offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business,
fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the
defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of
favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision
thereof;
(5) having been or being the party adverse to
the defendant in a civil action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in
a criminal prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury which
found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which has
tried another person for the particular offense
charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to
try the same charge, and whose verdict was set
aside, or which was discharged without a verdict
after the case was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action
brought against the defendant for the act
charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with
death, the entertaining of such conscientious
opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the juror from voting to impose the death
penalty following conviction regardless of the
facts;
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or interested in carrying
on any business, calling or employment, the car-
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rying on of which is a violation of law, where
defendant is charged with a like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness, either for
or against the defendant on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the defendant
is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of
the juror with reference to the cause, or to either
party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party challenging; but no person
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded
upon public rumor, statements in public journals
or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears
to the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly
upon the matter to be submitted to him.
(0 Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by
the prosecution and then by the defense alternately.
Challenges for cause shall be completed before peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be
impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which
they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties.
The prosecution and defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen.
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications,
take the same oath and enjoy the same privileges as
regular jurors.
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is
a privilege of the person exempted and is not a
ground for challenge for cause.
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and
each of them will well and truly try the matter in
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict
according to the evidence and the instructions of the
court.
Rule 19. Instructions.
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier
time as the court reasonably directs, any party may
file written request that the court instruct the jury on
the law as set forth in the request. At the same time
copies of such requests shall be furnished to the other
parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed
action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel
with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the
parties stipulate that such instructions may be given
orally, or otherwise waive this requirement.
(b) Upon each written request so presented and
given, or refused, the court shall endorse its decision
and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the
endorsement what part of the charge was given and
what part was refused.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the
charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly
the matter to which he objects and the ground of his
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object,
error may be assigned to instructions in order to
avoid a manifest injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in
the case, and if the court refers to any of the evidence,

